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Reflection	  On:	  On	  Reflection	  	   Declan	  Smithies	  	  The	  role	  of	  reflection	  in	  human	  rationality	  has	  been	  a	  central	  theme	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  from	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  through	  Descartes	  and	  Kant	  to	  contemporary	  figures	  as	  diverse	  as	  BonJour	  and	  Sosa,	  Shoemaker	  and	  McDowell,	  Frankfurt	  and	  Korsgaard.	  In	  his	  book,	  On	  Reflection,	  Hilary	  Kornblith	  criticizes	  what	  he	  regards	  as	  a	  chronic	  tendency	  in	  philosophy	  towards	  inflating	  the	  significance	  of	  reflection	  in	  ways	  that	  manifest	  a	  combination	  of	  philosophical	  naiveté	  and	  scientific	  ignorance	  about	  how	  reflection	  actually	  works.	  He	  writes:	  “Philosophers	  have	  typically	  assigned	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  value	  to	  reflection	  than	  it	  really	  deserves,	  and,	  more	  than	  this,	  they	  have	  done	  so	  because	  their	  view	  of	  what	  reflection	  is	  and	  what	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  achieving	  is	  terribly	  inaccurate”	  (2012:	  1).	  The	  book	  has	  a	  broad	  scope.	  It	  encompasses	  no	  less	  than	  four	  different	  areas	  of	  philosophy:	  epistemology,	  philosophy	  of	  mind,	  philosophy	  of	  action,	  and	  metaethics.	  The	  role	  of	  reflection	  is	  examined	  in	  connection	  with	  knowledge	  and	  justification	  (Ch.	  1),	  belief	  and	  reasoning	  (Ch.	  2),	  agency	  and	  free	  will	  (Ch.	  3),	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  normativity	  (Ch.	  4).	  The	  final	  chapter	  (Ch.	  5)	  turns	  to	  cognitive	  science	  where	  Kornblith	  surveys	  dual-­‐process	  theories	  of	  reasoning	  and	  argues	  that	  much	  of	  this	  work	  lends	  credence	  to	  the	  skeptical	  conclusion	  of	  the	  book.	  
On	  Reflection	  has	  much	  to	  recommend	  it.	  The	  book	  is	  written	  in	  an	  accessible	  and	  engaging	  style;	  it	  draws	  illuminating	  parallels	  between	  various	  areas	  of	  philosophy;	  it	  brings	  philosophy	  into	  contact	  with	  contemporary	  work	  in	  cognitive	  science;	  and	  it	  poses	  a	  powerful	  challenge	  to	  traditional	  views	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  reflection	  in	  understanding	  human	  nature.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  Kornblith’s	  book	  provides	  a	  valuable	  corrective	  to	  views	  that	  are	  overly	  sanguine	  about	  the	  powers	  of	  reflection.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  am	  not	  yet	  persuaded	  that	  we	  should	  accept	  its	  negative	  conclusion	  about	  the	  philosophical	  significance	  of	  reflection.	  This	  is	  a	  substantive	  disagreement,	  but	  not	  one	  that	  is	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easily	  resolved,	  and	  so	  I	  want	  to	  begin	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  contribution	  that	  Kornblith’s	  book	  makes	  in	  articulating	  such	  a	  clear	  and	  forceful	  challenge.	  My	  goal	  in	  these	  comments	  will	  be	  to	  take	  some	  preliminary	  steps	  towards	  meeting	  this	  challenge	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  advancing	  the	  conversation	  further.	  I	  will	  begin	  –	  as	  Kornblith	  does	  –	  with	  the	  debate	  in	  epistemology	  between	  internalist	  and	  externalist	  theories	  of	  knowledge,	  since	  it	  provides	  a	  good	  entry	  point	  into	  more	  general	  debates	  about	  the	  role	  of	  reflection	  in	  human	  nature.	  In	  Chapter	  1,	  Kornblith	  criticizes	  theories	  of	  knowledge	  that	  give	  a	  central	  role	  to	  reflection,	  including	  those	  of	  BonJour	  and	  Sosa.	  My	  main	  aim	  in	  these	  comments	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  my	  own	  theory	  (in	  Smithies	  2015)	  provides	  the	  resources	  to	  answer	  the	  main	  challenges	  that	  Kornblith	  raises	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  BonJour	  and	  Sosa.	  A	  secondary	  aim	  is	  to	  sketch	  a	  more	  general	  account	  of	  the	  philosophical	  significance	  of	  reflection	  that	  withstands	  Kornblith’s	  critique.	  	  
1. Justification	  and	  Reflection	  BonJour	  holds	  that	  a	  belief	  is	  knowledge	  only	  if	  it	  is	  justified,	  where	  a	  justified	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reflection.	  He	  motivates	  this	  view	  with	  his	  example	  of	  Norman,	  the	  clairvoyant:	  	   Norman,	  under	  certain	  conditions	  which	  usually	  obtain,	  is	  a	  completely	  reliable	  clairvoyant	  with	  respect	  to	  certain	  kinds	  of	  subject	  matter.	  He	  possesses	  no	  evidence	  or	  reasons	  of	  any	  kind	  for	  or	  against	  the	  general	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  cognitive	  power	  or	  for	  or	  against	  the	  thesis	  that	  he	  possesses	  it.	  One	  day	  Norman	  comes	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  President	  is	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  though	  he	  has	  no	  evidence	  either	  for	  or	  against	  this	  belief.	  In	  fact	  the	  belief	  is	  true	  and	  results	  from	  his	  clairvoyant	  power	  under	  circumstances	  in	  which	  it	  is	  completely	  reliable.	  (1985:	  41)	  	  BonJour	  argues	  Norman’s	  belief	  is	  unjustified.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  Norman	  neglects	  his	  epistemic	  duty	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  credentials	  of	  his	  belief	  with	  the	  result	  that	  his	  belief	  is	  held	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  irresponsible	  and	  so	  unjustified.	  He	  writes:	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   Norman’s	  acceptance	  of	  the	  belief	  about	  the	  President’s	  whereabouts	  is	  epistemically	  irrational	  and	  irresponsible,	  and	  thereby	  unjustified,	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  believes	  himself	  to	  have	  clairvoyant	  power,	  so	  long	  as	  he	  has	  no	  justification	  for	  such	  a	  belief.	  Part	  of	  one’s	  epistemic	  duty	  is	  to	  reflect	  critically	  upon	  one’s	  beliefs,	  and	  such	  critical	  reflection	  precludes	  believing	  things	  to	  which	  one	  has,	  to	  one’s	  knowledge,	  no	  reliable	  means	  of	  epistemic	  access.	  (1985:	  42)	  	  We	  can	  make	  BonJour’s	  reasoning	  explicit	  as	  follows.	  The	  first	  premise	  states	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  justified	  belief,	  according	  to	  which	  a	  belief	  is	  justified	  only	  if	  it	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reflection,	  while	  the	  second	  premise	  adds	  that	  Norman	  does	  not	  satisfy	  this	  condition:	  	   (1) A	  belief	  is	  justified	  only	  if	  it	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reflection.	  (2) Norman’s	  belief	  is	  not	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reflection.	  (3) Therefore,	  Norman’s	  belief	  is	  unjustified.	  	  The	  key	  idea	  then	  is	  that	  a	  justified	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  withstands	  reflective	  scrutiny.	  A	  different	  account	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  justification	  and	  reflection	  is	  proposed	  by	  Alston	  (1989)	  and	  developed	  further	  in	  work	  of	  mine	  (Smithies	  2015).	  Alston’s	  claim	  is	  not	  that	  reflection	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  make	  one’s	  beliefs	  justified,	  but	  rather	  that	  reflection	  is	  the	  activity	  with	  reference	  to	  which	  the	  standards	  for	  justification	  are	  defined.	  He	  writes:	  	   It	  would	  be	  absurd	  to	  suggest	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be…justified,	  a	  belief	  must	  actually	  have	  been	  put	  to	  the	  test	  and	  emerged	  victorious….	  [T]he	  idea	  is	  rather	  that	  what	  it	  is	  for	  a	  belief	  to	  be	  justified	  is	  that	  the	  belief	  and	  its	  ground	  be	  such	  that	  it	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  pass	  such	  a	  test;	  that	  the	  subject	  has	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  respond	  successfully	  to	  such	  a	  challenge.	  A	  justified	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  could	  survive	  a	  critical	  reflection.	  (1989:	  225)	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  To	  a	  first	  approximation,	  Alston’s	  proposal	  is	  that	  justification	  is	  the	  epistemic	  property	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  a	  belief	  has	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  survive	  reflective	  scrutiny.	  BonJour	  claims	  that	  a	  justified	  belief	  must	  actually	  withstand	  the	  test	  of	  reflective	  scrutiny,	  whereas	  Alston	  claims	  that	  a	  justified	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  withstand	  such	  a	  test.	  On	  this	  view,	  a	  justified	  belief	  is	  stable	  under	  reflection	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  if	  it	  were	  subjected	  to	  reflective	  scrutiny,	  then	  it	  would	  survive;	  and	  moreover,	  it	  would	  survive	  on	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  it	  is	  actually	  held.1	  We	  can	  use	  this	  theory	  of	  justification	  to	  give	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  of	  why	  Norman’s	  clairvoyant	  beliefs	  are	  unjustified.	  Norman’s	  beliefs	  are	  not	  stable	  under	  reflection	  because,	  as	  BonJour	  points	  out	  in	  the	  passage	  quoted	  above,	  “reflection	  precludes	  believing	  things	  to	  which	  one	  has,	  to	  one’s	  knowledge,	  no	  reliable	  means	  of	  epistemic	  access.”	  So,	  we	  can	  argue,	  as	  before,	  that	  Norman	  does	  not	  satisfy	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  justified	  belief:	  	   (1) A	  belief	  is	  justified	  only	  if	  it	  is	  stable	  under	  reflection.	  (2) Norman’s	  belief	  is	  not	  stable	  under	  reflection.	  (3) Therefore,	  Norman’s	  belief	  is	  unjustified.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  my	  aim	  is	  to	  defend	  this	  account	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  justification	  and	  reflection	  against	  various	  objections	  raised	  in	  Kornblith’s	  book.	  I	  divide	  these	  into	  four	  categories:	  (i)	  the	  over-­‐intellectualization	  problem;	  (ii)	  the	  regress	  problem;	  (iii)	  the	  empirical	  problem;	  and	  (iv)	  the	  value	  problem.	  	  
2. The	  Over-­‐Intellectualization	  Problem	  The	  first	  problem	  that	  Kornblith	  raises	  is	  the	  over-­‐intellectualization	  problem.	  He	  writes:	  “Most	  of	  our	  beliefs	  are	  formed	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  critical	  reflection,	  and	  
                                                1	  This	  clause	  is	  needed	  to	  rule	  out	  unjustified	  beliefs	  that	  would	  survive	  reflection	  if	  their	  basis	  were	  to	  change	  during	  the	  process.	  Additional	  qualifications	  are	  needed	  to	  avoid	  the	  conditional	  fallacy	  objection,	  but	  see	  Smithies	  (2015)	  for	  details.	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so,	  on	  BonJour’s	  view,	  most	  of	  our	  beliefs	  are	  not	  in	  fact	  justified,	  and	  we	  thus	  have	  precious	  little	  knowledge”	  (2012:	  11).	  BonJour’s	  account	  has	  skeptical	  implications.	  Traditionally,	  the	  skeptic	  argues	  that	  knowledge	  is	  impossible,	  whereas	  BonJour	  maintains	  that	  knowledge	  is	  possible	  in	  principle,	  even	  if	  this	  possibility	  is	  rarely	  actualized	  in	  practice.	  Still,	  it	  is	  quite	  implausible	  to	  suppose	  that	  beliefs	  held	  unreflectively	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception,	  memory,	  testimony,	  induction,	  and	  deduction	  can	  never	  be	  justified	  by	  the	  evidence	  on	  which	  they	  are	  held	  and	  so	  can	  never	  constitute	  knowledge.	  One	  response	  is	  to	  weaken	  the	  conditions	  for	  justification:	  for	  instance,	  it	  might	  be	  said	  that	  one	  need	  not	  actually	  reflect	  in	  order	  to	  have	  justified	  beliefs	  so	  long	  as	  one	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  so.	  But	  this	  condition	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  justification,	  since	  we	  may	  suppose	  that	  Norman	  has	  the	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  but	  negligently	  fails	  to	  exercise	  the	  capacity:	  his	  belief	  should	  not	  thereby	  count	  as	  justified.	  And	  the	  more	  important	  point	  for	  current	  purposes	  is	  that	  this	  condition	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  justification,	  at	  least	  not	  given	  the	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  children	  and	  animals	  can	  have	  justified	  beliefs	  while	  lacking	  any	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  at	  all.	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  Kornblith	  defends	  and	  motivates	  this	  assumption.	  Many	  philosophers	  (including	  Shoemaker,	  McDowell,	  Brandom,	  and	  Williams)	  have	  argued	  that	  having	  justified	  beliefs,	  and	  even	  having	  beliefs	  at	  all,	  requires	  being	  responsive	  to	  reasons,	  which	  in	  turn	  requires	  the	  capacity	  for	  reflection.	  Kornblith	  blocks	  this	  argument	  by	  distinguishing	  two	  senses	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  reasons:	  he	  argues	  that	  justified	  belief	  requires	  sensitivity	  to	  reasons,	  but	  does	  not	  require	  conceptualizing	  reasons	  as	  reasons,	  and	  so	  does	  not	  require	  any	  capacity	  for	  reflection.	  Moreover,	  Kornblith	  argues	  on	  empirical	  grounds	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  cognition	  without	  metacognition,	  citing	  the	  broken	  wing	  display	  in	  piping	  plovers,	  termite	  fishing	  in	  chimpanzees,	  and	  linguistic	  abilities	  in	  three-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  who	  fail	  the	  false	  belief	  task.	  In	  these	  cases,	  he	  argues,	  information	  is	  not	  only	  represented,	  but	  also	  integrated	  in	  ways	  that	  manifest	  the	  kind	  of	  sensitivity	  to	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reasons	  that	  is	  required	  for	  justified	  belief.	  I	  am	  in	  full	  agreement	  with	  Kornblith	  on	  these	  points.2	  A	  different	  response	  to	  the	  over-­‐intellectualization	  problem	  is	  to	  maintain	  that	  justified	  belief	  requires	  the	  capacity	  for	  reflection,	  while	  denying	  that	  knowledge	  requires	  justified	  belief	  so	  construed.	  Sosa	  articulates	  a	  version	  of	  this	  response	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  distinction	  between	  animal	  knowledge	  and	  reflective	  
knowledge:	  	   For	  animal	  knowledge	  one	  needs	  only	  belief	  that	  is	  apt	  and	  derives	  from	  an	  intellectual	  virtue	  or	  faculty.	  By	  contrast,	  reflective	  knowledge	  always	  requires	  belief	  that	  is	  not	  only	  apt	  but	  also	  has	  a	  kind	  of	  justification,	  since	  it	  must	  be	  belief	  that	  fits	  coherently	  within	  the	  epistemic	  perspective	  of	  the	  believer.	  (1991:	  145)	  	  Animal	  knowledge	  does	  not	  require	  justification	  in	  any	  sense	  that	  enjoins	  a	  capacity	  for	  reflection:	  it	  requires	  only	  true	  belief	  that	  is	  “apt”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  derives	  from	  an	  “intellectual	  virtue”	  or	  reliable	  disposition	  of	  the	  believer.	  Reflective	  knowledge,	  in	  contrast,	  requires	  not	  only	  true	  belief	  that	  is	  formed	  in	  a	  reliable	  way,	  but	  also	  belief	  that	  is	  justified	  by	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  formed	  in	  a	  reliable	  way.	  In	  a	  slogan,	  reflective	  knowledge	  is	  “apt	  belief	  aptly	  noted”.3	  Kornblith’s	  main	  complaint	  is	  that	  Sosa’s	  distinction,	  though	  well	  defined,	  is	  not	  worth	  making	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  carve	  at	  the	  epistemological	  joints.	  In	  that	  respect,	  it	  is	  like	  the	  distinction	  between	  knowledge	  acquired	  on	  weekdays	  as	  opposed	  to	  weekends.	  The	  challenge	  that	  Kornblith	  lays	  down	  for	  Sosa	  and	  others	  is	  
                                                2	  See	  Boghossian’s	  contribution	  to	  this	  symposium	  for	  doubts	  about	  the	  first-­‐order	  account	  of	  reasoning	  that	  Kornblith	  endorses.	  My	  own	  view	  is	  closer	  to	  Kornblith’s	  insofar	  as	  I	  am	  inclined	  towards	  accepting	  a	  first-­‐order	  account	  of	  reasoning.	  3	  Sosa	  (1991:	  144-­‐5;	  245)	  defines	  animal	  knowledge	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  contrast	  between	  aptness	  and	  justification,	  but	  elsewhere	  (e.g.	  Sosa	  2009:	  238-­‐9)	  he	  defines	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  contrast	  between	  reflective	  and	  unreflective	  justification.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  can	  see,	  the	  difference	  in	  presentation	  is	  purely	  terminological.	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to	  explain	  why	  reflective	  knowledge	  is	  different	  in	  kind	  from	  animal	  knowledge	  and	  not	  just	  more	  knowledge	  of	  the	  same	  kind.	  As	  I	  will	  explain	  in	  due	  course,	  I	  agree	  with	  Sosa	  that	  there	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  animal	  knowledge	  and	  reflective	  knowledge.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  accept	  Sosa’s	  account	  of	  the	  distinction.	  In	  particular,	  I	  reject	  the	  suggestion	  that	  mere	  reliability	  of	  the	  right	  kind	  is	  sufficient	  for	  animal	  knowledge.	  Sosa’s	  account	  puts	  Norman’s	  clairvoyant	  beliefs	  on	  the	  same	  footing	  as	  the	  perceptual	  beliefs	  of	  children	  and	  animals	  insofar	  as	  they	  satisfy	  the	  conditions	  for	  animal	  knowledge.4	  But	  that	  is	  the	  wrong	  result.	  There	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  Norman’s	  belief	  is	  knowledge	  and	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  is	  justified.	  To	  avoid	  this	  result,	  we	  cannot	  sever	  the	  connection	  between	  animal	  knowledge	  and	  reflection	  altogether.	  We	  just	  need	  a	  more	  nuanced	  account	  of	  the	  connection.	  On	  my	  view,	  knowledge	  requires	  justified	  belief,	  but	  justified	  belief	  requires	  no	  capacity	  for	  reflection.	  To	  say	  that	  a	  justified	  belief	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  survive	  reflection	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  subject	  has	  the	  reflective	  capacities	  needed	  to	  realize	  this	  potential.	  A	  justified	  belief	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  survive	  reflection	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  it	  is	  held	  and	  not	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  subject’s	  reflective	  capacities.	  A	  justified	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  is	  stable	  under	  reflection	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  would	  survive	  on	  its	  actual	  basis	  if	  it	  were	  subjected	  to	  reflection	  by	  some	  idealized	  counterpart	  of	  the	  subject	  who	  has	  the	  very	  same	  evidence	  but	  also	  has	  the	  requisite	  capacity	  for	  reflection.	  Animals	  and	  children	  can	  have	  justified	  beliefs	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  so	  long	  as	  their	  beliefs	  are	  stable	  under	  reflection	  in	  the	  sense	  defined.5	  So,	  unlike	  BonJour,	  we	  need	  not	  deny	  that	  animals	  and	  children	  have	  knowledge.	  But	  unlike	  Sosa,	  we	  needn’t	  concede	  that	  Norman	  has	  knowledge	  too,	  
                                                4	  Sosa	  (1991:	  240)	  says	  that	  “no	  human	  blessed	  with	  reason	  has	  merely	  animal	  knowledge	  of	  the	  sort	  attainable	  by	  beasts.”	  But	  we	  can	  avoid	  this	  complication	  by	  stipulating	  that	  Norman	  is	  a	  child	  or	  an	  animal	  with	  a	  faculty	  of	  clairvoyance	  and	  adjusting	  the	  details	  of	  the	  case	  accordingly.	  5	  Here	  I	  disagree	  with	  Alston	  (1989:	  226,	  n.	  45)	  who	  denies	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  justification	  applies	  to	  dogs	  and	  other	  unreflective	  animals.	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since	  his	  clairvoyant	  beliefs	  are	  not	  stable	  under	  reflection	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense.	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  avoid	  the	  problems	  for	  BonJour	  and	  Sosa	  alike.	  	  
3. The	  Regress	  Problem	  The	  second	  problem	  that	  Kornblith	  raises	  is	  the	  regress	  problem.6	  On	  BonJour’s	  account,	  a	  first-­‐order	  belief	  is	  justified	  only	  if	  the	  second-­‐order	  reflections	  on	  which	  it	  is	  based	  are	  themselves	  justified.	  But	  these	  second-­‐order	  reflections	  are	  justified	  only	  if	  they	  are	  held	  in	  turn	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  justified	  third-­‐order	  reflections.	  And	  so	  the	  infinite	  regress	  begins.	  As	  Kornblith	  remarks:	  “No	  amount	  of	  reflective	  scrutiny	  is	  enough,	  for,	  whenever	  one	  stops	  reflecting,	  there	  is	  always	  some	  belief	  playing	  a	  would-­‐be	  justificatory	  role	  which	  has	  itself	  gone	  unreflected	  upon”	  (2012:	  13).	  Notice	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  help	  to	  weaken	  the	  conditions	  for	  justified	  belief	  so	  that	  the	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  is	  sufficient	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  exercised.	  Even	  the	  most	  reflective	  humans	  have	  limited	  capacities	  for	  reflection:	  in	  particular,	  there	  are	  limits	  on	  the	  length	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  reflective	  processes	  that	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  undertaking.	  But	  my	  proposal	  avoids	  this	  objection.	  Recall	  that	  a	  justified	  belief	  is	  stable	  upon	  reflection	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  it	  is	  held	  and	  not	  in	  virtue	  of	  one’s	  reflective	  capacities.	  So	  even	  if	  there	  are	  limits	  on	  the	  length	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  reflective	  processes	  that	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  undertaking,	  there	  are	  no	  such	  limits	  on	  the	  length	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  reflective	  processes	  that	  our	  justified	  beliefs	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  withstand.	  A	  justified	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  withstand	  reflection	  of	  any	  finite	  length	  and	  complexity	  when	  conducted	  by	  an	  idealized	  counterpart	  with	  the	  very	  same	  evidence	  together	  with	  the	  requisite	  capacity	  for	  reflection.	  But	  there	  are	  no	  finite	  limits	  on	  the	  length	  and	  complexity	  of	  reflective	  processes	  that	  our	  idealized	  counterparts	  can	  perform.	  The	  point	  remains	  that	  for	  every	  finite	  process	  of	  reflection,	  “there	  is	  always	  some	  belief	  playing	  a	  would-­‐be	  justificatory	  role	  which	  has	  itself	  gone	  unreflected	  
                                                6	  Compare	  Bergmann’s	  (2006:	  Ch.	  1)	  dilemma	  for	  internalism:	  he	  argues	  that	  internalism	  is	  either	  false	  because	  it	  entails	  a	  vicious	  infinite	  regress	  or	  unmotivated	  because	  it	  does	  not	  vindicate	  intuitions	  about	  Norman	  the	  clairvoyant.	  As	  I	  explain	  in	  Smithies	  (2015),	  my	  proposal	  avoids	  both	  horns	  of	  Bergmann’s	  dilemma.	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upon”.	  But	  this	  point	  is	  not	  damning	  for	  me	  in	  the	  way	  it	  is	  for	  BonJour.	  The	  problem	  for	  BonJour	  is	  that	  one’s	  higher-­‐order	  reflections	  cannot	  contribute	  towards	  the	  justification	  of	  first-­‐order	  beliefs	  unless	  they	  are	  justified	  by	  reflection	  themselves.	  The	  skeptical	  conclusion	  is	  therefore	  guaranteed	  for	  any	  finite	  subject	  who	  cannot	  engage	  in	  an	  infinite	  process	  of	  reflection.	  Unlike	  BonJour,	  though,	  I	  don’t	  accept	  that	  a	  belief	  is	  justified	  only	  if	  it	  is	  reflected	  upon.	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  a	  belief	  can	  play	  a	  justificatory	  role	  without	  being	  reflected	  upon,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  withstand	  reflection	  by	  an	  appropriately	  idealized	  counterpart	  of	  the	  subject.	  But	  this	  point	  can	  be	  sustained	  so	  long	  as	  there	  are	  no	  finite	  limits	  on	  the	  length	  and	  complexity	  of	  reflective	  processes	  that	  our	  idealized	  counterparts	  can	  perform.	  	  
4. The	  Empirical	  Problem	  The	  third	  problem	  that	  Kornblith	  raises	  is	  the	  empirical	  problem.	  Reflection	  is	  sometimes	  thought	  to	  make	  us	  more	  reliable	  by	  weeding	  out	  logical	  fallacies,	  hasty	  generalizations,	  baseless	  prejudice,	  and	  wishful	  thinking.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  one	  clear	  rationale	  for	  thinking	  that	  reflection	  is	  necessary	  for	  justified	  belief.	  However,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  reflection	  does	  not	  always	  make	  us	  more	  reliable	  and	  indeed	  often	  makes	  us	  less	  reliable.	  Thus,	  Kornblith	  concludes:	  “What	  commonsense	  tells	  us	  is	  a	  way	  of	  screening	  our	  beliefs	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  more	  accurate	  turns	  out,	  instead,	  in	  many	  cases,	  to	  be	  a	  route	  to	  little	  more	  than	  self-­‐congratulation”	  (2012:	  3).	  Here	  are	  the	  main	  points	  of	  Kornblith’s	  review	  of	  the	  empirical	  literature.	  There	  is	  a	  large	  class	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  our	  beliefs	  are	  influenced	  by	  seemingly	  irrelevant	  factors	  that	  we	  are	  unaware	  of	  and	  whose	  influence	  is	  undetectable	  by	  means	  of	  introspection.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  we	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  engage	  in	  confabulation	  that	  yields	  a	  post-­‐hoc	  rationalization	  for	  these	  beliefs,	  while	  remaining	  ignorant	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  what	  we’re	  doing.	  To	  mention	  just	  one	  classic	  study	  from	  a	  much	  larger	  literature:	  Nisbett	  and	  Wilson	  (1977)	  found	  that	  subjects	  displayed	  a	  strong	  right-­‐hand-­‐side	  bias	  when	  choosing	  between	  qualitatively	  identical	  pairs	  of	  socks,	  but	  were	  unaware	  of	  this	  bias,	  while	  also	  tending	  to	  rationalize	  their	  choices	  by	  citing	  non-­‐existent	  differences	  in	  texture,	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color,	  and	  so	  on.	  Kornblith	  surveys	  many	  other	  experiments	  in	  this	  vein	  and	  draws	  the	  following	  conclusion:	  “Asking	  subjects	  to	  introspect	  more	  carefully,	  or	  think	  longer	  and	  harder	  about	  the	  sources	  of	  their	  beliefs,	  is	  entirely	  useless	  in	  many	  of	  these	  cases”	  (2012:	  23).	  I	  have	  several	  points	  to	  make	  in	  response	  to	  this	  empirical	  problem.	  The	  first	  point	  is	  that	  reflection	  can	  make	  us	  more	  reliable	  when	  it	  is	  done	  well.	  In	  Nisbett	  and	  Wilson’s	  study,	  for	  instance,	  reflection	  alone	  cannot	  yield	  knowledge	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  right-­‐hand-­‐side	  bias,	  but	  it	  can	  yield	  knowledge	  that	  there’s	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  socks	  on	  the	  right	  are	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  those	  on	  the	  left.	  Reflection,	  when	  it	  is	  done	  well,	  has	  the	  power	  to	  override	  confabulation	  and	  to	  yield	  knowledge	  that	  the	  choice	  was	  made	  for	  no	  good	  reason.	  Of	  course,	  what	  the	  empirical	  findings	  show	  is	  that	  reflection	  is	  not	  always	  done	  well	  –	  we	  do	  sometimes	  engage	  in	  confabulation	  and	  perhaps	  much	  more	  often	  than	  we	  tend	  to	  realize.7	  The	  second	  point,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  about	  the	  power	  of	  reflection	  is	  not	  universally	  negative.	  Reflection	  can	  and	  does	  increase	  our	  reliability	  in	  reasoning	  about	  a	  range	  of	  distinct	  topics.	  Here	  are	  three	  examples	  from	  a	  recent	  review	  by	  Baumeister,	  Masicampo	  and	  Vohs	  (2011).8	  First,	  logical	  reasoning:	  Gagne	  and	  Smith	  (1962)	  found	  that	  performance	  on	  the	  Tower	  of	  Hanoi	  problem	  was	  improved	  in	  subjects	  who	  were	  required	  to	  verbalize	  their	  reasons	  for	  each	  move.	  Second,	  moral	  reasoning:	  Small	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  counteracted	  the	  identifiable	  victim	  effect	  by	  instructing	  subjects	  to	  engage	  in	  deliberation	  about	  their	  decisions	  to	  donate	  money	  to	  charity.	  And	  third,	  emotion	  regulation:	  Pennebaker	  and	  Chung	  (2007)	  found	  that	  asking	  subjects	  to	  reflect	  on	  traumatic	  personal	  experiences	  caused	  improvements	  in	  health	  that	  resulted	  from	  analyzing	  the	  trauma.	  The	  final	  point	  is	  that	  an	  account	  of	  the	  reflective	  stability	  of	  justified	  belief	  needs	  to	  be	  qualified	  in	  light	  of	  these	  empirical	  facts.	  When	  reflection	  is	  done	  poorly,	  justified	  beliefs	  can	  be	  abandoned	  and	  unjustified	  beliefs	  can	  be	  retained.	  So	  a	  
                                                7	  The	  literature	  on	  implicit	  bias	  is	  especially	  relevant	  here.	  See	  Gendler	  (2014)	  for	  a	  recent	  review	  and	  discussion.	  8	  The	  official	  topic	  of	  Baumeister’s	  review	  is	  the	  role	  of	  consciousness	  in	  reasoning,	  but	  consciousness	  is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  reflection.	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justified	  belief	  cannot	  be	  defined	  as	  one	  that	  is	  stable	  under	  reflection	  as	  it	  is	  actually	  performed.	  Instead,	  a	  justified	  belief	  should	  be	  defined	  as	  one	  that	  is	  stable	  under	  idealized	  reflection	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  reflection	  that	  is	  ideally	  rational,	  reasonable,	  or	  justified.	  On	  this	  proposal,	  we	  idealize	  not	  only	  the	  subject’s	  capacity	  to	  engage	  in	  reflection	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  but	  also	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  capacity	  is	  exercised.	  Ideal	  reflection	  so	  construed	  may	  diverge	  from	  actual	  reflection	  in	  its	  deliverances,	  but	  it	  should	  nevertheless	  be	  recognizable	  as	  an	  idealized	  version	  of	  the	  same	  activity.	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  Kornblith	  discusses	  a	  related	  proposal	  in	  Korsgaard’s	  work	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons.	  She	  writes:	  	   We	  need	  reasons	  because	  our	  impulses	  must	  be	  able	  to	  withstand	  reflective	  scrutiny.	  We	  have	  reasons	  if	  they	  do.	  The	  normative	  word	  ‘reason’	  refers	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  reflective	  success.	  (1996:	  93)	  	  Korsgaard’s	  proposal	  is	  intended	  to	  solve	  a	  metaphysical	  problem	  about	  the	  source	  of	  normativity.	  Her	  proposal	  is	  that	  normativity	  has	  its	  source	  in	  reflection	  because	  the	  correct	  normative	  standards	  are	  the	  standards	  that	  we	  would	  endorse	  upon	  reflection.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  our	  reflections	  will	  converge	  upon	  correct	  normative	  standards	  given	  the	  empirical	  facts	  about	  the	  unreliability	  of	  reflection.	  Therefore,	  Korsgaard	  invokes	  an	  idealization:	  she	  appeals	  to	  “a	  person	  who	  reasons	  all	  the	  way	  back,	  who	  never	  gives	  up	  until	  there	  is	  a	  completely	  undeniable,	  satisfying,	  unconditional	  answer	  to	  the	  question”.	  But	  the	  problem	  remains	  since	  idealizing	  the	  length	  of	  reflection	  without	  idealizing	  its	  quality	  does	  nothing	  to	  guarantee	  that	  reflection	  will	  converge	  upon	  correct	  normative	  standards.	  What	  Korsgaard	  needs	  is	  a	  more	  robustly	  normative	  idealization,	  but	  she	  cannot	  avail	  herself	  of	  this	  without	  undermining	  the	  metaphysical	  project	  of	  explaining	  the	  source	  of	  normativity.	  My	  response	  to	  the	  empirical	  problem	  invokes	  a	  normative	  idealization.	  I	  claim	  that	  a	  justified	  belief	  is	  stable	  under	  reflection	  that	  is	  ideally	  rational,	  reasonable,	  or	  justified.	  This	  kind	  of	  normative	  idealization	  is	  useless	  for	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Korsgaard’s	  project	  because	  the	  idealization	  presupposes	  normative	  facts	  of	  the	  kind	  she	  seeks	  to	  explain.	  But	  my	  project	  is	  distinct	  from	  Korsgaard’s	  insofar	  as	  I	  am	  not	  trying	  to	  give	  a	  metaphysical	  account	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  normativity	  and	  so	  I	  can	  appeal	  to	  normative	  facts	  in	  constraining	  the	  idealization.	  One	  might	  suspect	  that	  the	  normative	  idealization	  trivializes	  the	  proposal.	  Certainly,	  there	  is	  an	  element	  of	  circularity	  involved	  in	  analyzing	  a	  justified	  belief	  as	  one	  that	  is	  stable	  under	  ideally	  justified	  reflection.	  So	  the	  analysis	  is	  non-­‐reductive,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  non-­‐trivial.	  The	  general	  form	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  as	  follows:	  	   S’s	  belief	  B	  is	  justified	  if	  and	  only	  if	  S	  has	  belief	  B	  in	  ideal	  conditions	  C.	  	  If	  ideal	  conditions	  are	  defined	  as	  conditions	  in	  which	  one’s	  beliefs	  are	  justified,	  then	  the	  analysis	  is	  trivial.	  But	  on	  the	  present	  proposal,	  ideal	  conditions	  are	  defined	  as	  conditions	  in	  which	  one’s	  higher-­‐order	  reflections	  on	  one’s	  beliefs	  are	  justified.	  It	  is	  a	  substantive	  commitment	  of	  the	  proposal	  that	  one’s	  beliefs	  are	  justified	  if	  and	  only	  if	  they	  can	  be	  brought	  into	  alignment	  with	  these	  justified	  higher-­‐order	  reflections.	  Notice	  also	  that	  my	  proposal,	  unlike	  BonJour’s,	  makes	  no	  commitment	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  have	  a	  standing	  obligation	  to	  engage	  in	  reflection.	  Kornblith	  raises	  the	  objection	  that	  we	  have	  no	  such	  obligation	  when	  we	  have	  empirical	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  engaging	  in	  reflection	  is	  likely	  to	  make	  us	  less	  reliable.	  What	  this	  shows,	  I	  think,	  is	  that	  for	  non-­‐ideal	  agents	  like	  us,	  sometimes	  the	  best	  strategy	  for	  forming	  justified	  beliefs	  that	  are	  stable	  under	  reflection	  is	  actually	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  reflection	  at	  all.	  But	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  proposal	  that	  reflection	  sets	  the	  standards	  for	  what	  is	  to	  count	  as	  a	  justified	  belief	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
5. The	  Value	  Problem	  The	  fourth	  and	  final	  problem	  that	  Kornblith	  raises	  is	  the	  value	  problem.	  If	  justification	  is	  an	  epistemic	  standard	  that	  is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  stability	  under	  reflection,	  then	  why	  should	  we	  care	  about	  justification	  –	  that	  is,	  why	  should	  we	  regard	  it	  as	  an	  important	  dimension	  of	  epistemic	  value?	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One	  response	  is	  that	  justification	  is	  valuable	  because	  reflection	  makes	  us	  more	  reliable	  and	  so	  beliefs	  that	  are	  stable	  under	  reflection	  are	  objectively	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  true.9	  I	  agree	  with	  Kornblith	  that	  this	  response	  is	  inadequate.	  The	  empirical	  problem,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  that	  reflection	  sometimes	  makes	  us	  less	  reliable.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  we	  can	  avoid	  this	  problem	  by	  invoking	  an	  idealization.	  But	  the	  value	  problem	  remains,	  since	  not	  even	  ideally	  rational	  reflection	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  make	  us	  more	  reliable.	  There	  are	  two	  points	  to	  be	  made	  here.	  First,	  ideally	  rational	  reflection	  does	  not	  guarantee	  reliability;	  for	  instance,	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  Cartesian	  evil	  demon	  can	  engage	  in	  ideally	  rational	  reflection	  without	  thereby	  achieving	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  reliability.	  And	  second,	  whatever	  reliability	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  rational	  reflection	  can	  in	  principle	  be	  achieved	  without	  it.	  On	  Kornblith’s	  view,	  reflection	  has	  no	  distinctive	  epistemic	  value.	  Reflection	  is	  just	  one	  way	  of	  forming	  beliefs	  among	  many	  and	  it	  is	  valuable	  insofar	  as	  it	  makes	  us	  more	  reliable	  and	  not	  otherwise.	  Thus,	  he	  writes:	  “From	  an	  epistemological	  point	  of	  view,	  we	  should	  value	  reflection	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  and	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  it	  contributes	  to	  our	  reliability.	  Epistemologically	  speaking,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  value	  reflectively	  arrived	  at	  belief	  in	  general	  over	  unreflective	  belief.”	  (2012:	  34)	  In	  this	  passage,	  Kornblith	  seems	  to	  be	  assuming	  a	  version	  of	  monism	  about	  epistemic	  value	  on	  which	  truth	  is	  the	  only	  intrinsic	  epistemic	  good.10	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  epistemic	  value	  of	  reflection	  must	  be	  explained	  instrumentally	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  reliability	  or	  conduciveness	  towards	  truth.	  Given	  pluralism	  about	  epistemic	  value,	  in	  contrast,	  there	  are	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  epistemic	  goodness	  not	  all	  of	  which	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  reliability	  or	  truth-­‐conduciveness.	  I	  think	  it	  begs	  the	  question	  in	  the	  present	  context	  to	  assume	  that	  reliability	  is	  the	  only	  dimension	  of	  epistemic	  value,	  since	  many	  internalist	  theories	  deny	  that	  all	  epistemic	  values	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  reliability.	  Even	  so,	  the	  challenge	  remains	  to	  explain	  why	  
                                                9	  There	  is	  a	  trivial	  sense	  in	  which	  justified	  beliefs	  are	  epistemically	  likely	  to	  be	  true,	  since	  the	  epistemic	  likelihood	  of	  a	  proposition	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  likelihood	  that	  it	  is	  true	  on	  the	  justifying	  evidence	  that	  is	  available.	  10	  See	  DePaul	  (2001)	  for	  the	  distinction	  between	  monism	  and	  pluralism	  about	  epistemic	  value.	  See	  Kornblith	  (2002:	  Ch.	  5)	  for	  a	  more	  extended	  discussion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  justification	  and	  truth.	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reflection	  is	  valuable	  given	  that	  it	  is	  not	  always	  guaranteed	  to	  increase	  reliability.	  Are	  there	  other	  benefits	  that	  reflection	  provides	  that	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  in	  any	  other	  way?	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  reflection	  is	  important	  because	  it	  is	  required	  for	  being	  a	  
person	  –	  that	  is,	  a	  subject	  who	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  their	  beliefs	  and	  actions	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  make	  demands	  on	  them	  by	  adopting	  reactive	  
attitudes.	  On	  this	  account,	  persons	  are	  distinguished	  from	  other	  animals	  by	  features	  of	  their	  individual	  psychology	  –	  namely,	  their	  capacity	  for	  reflection.	  But	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  capacity	  emerges	  only	  given	  its	  function	  in	  the	  social	  and	  interpersonal	  context	  of	  participation	  in	  human	  relationships.	  As	  I	  use	  the	  concept,	  personhood	  is	  not	  a	  biological	  category,	  but	  an	  evaluative	  one.	  Frankfurt	  puts	  the	  point	  eloquently	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	  	   The	  criteria	  for	  being	  a	  person	  do	  not	  serve	  primarily	  to	  distinguish	  the	  members	  of	  our	  own	  species	  from	  the	  members	  of	  other	  species.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  designed	  to	  capture	  those	  attributes	  which	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  our	  most	  humane	  concern	  with	  ourselves	  and	  the	  source	  of	  what	  we	  regard	  as	  most	  important	  and	  most	  problematical	  in	  our	  lives.	  (1971:	  6)	  	  Even	  if	  ours	  is	  the	  only	  species	  whose	  members	  meet	  the	  criteria	  for	  being	  persons,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  in	  principle	  to	  suppose	  that	  members	  of	  other	  species,	  such	  as	  intelligent	  aliens,	  couldn’t	  satisfy	  these	  criteria	  too.	  So	  what	  are	  the	  criteria	  for	  being	  a	  person?	  Persons	  are	  distinguished	  from	  other	  animals	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  their	  beliefs	  and	  choices.	  This	  is	  why	  we	  regard	  it	  as	  appropriate	  to	  make	  moral	  and	  rational	  demands	  on	  them	  by	  subjecting	  them	  to	  what	  Strawson	  (1962)	  called	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes,	  such	  as	  praise	  and	  blame,	  gratitude	  and	  resentment,	  and	  so	  on.	  We	  don’t	  we	  regard	  it	  as	  appropriate	  to	  adopt	  these	  attitudes	  towards	  other	  animals.	  As	  Kornblith	  remarks:	  “When	  my	  neighbor’s	  dog	  runs	  loose	  in	  my	  garden	  and	  destroys	  the	  flowers,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  dog	  who	  is	  responsible,	  but	  my	  neighbor.”	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Responsibility	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  justification:	  it	  is	  a	  more	  demanding	  status.	  Kornblith	  makes	  a	  persuasive	  case	  that	  many	  non-­‐human	  animals	  can	  form	  beliefs	  and	  perform	  actions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  justified	  by	  their	  sensitivity	  to	  reasons,	  but	  he	  also	  notes	  that	  we	  do	  not	  hold	  non-­‐human	  animals	  responsible	  for	  the	  justification	  of	  their	  beliefs	  and	  actions.	  The	  question	  that	  remains	  is	  why	  it	  is	  that	  persons	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  justification	  of	  their	  beliefs	  and	  choices	  in	  a	  way	  that	  other	  animals	  cannot.	  And	  here	  I	  can	  see	  no	  plausible	  alternative	  to	  the	  traditional	  Lockean	  answer	  that	  persons	  are	  distinguished	  from	  other	  animals	  by	  their	  capacity	  for	  reflection.	  The	  argument	  so	  far	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  an	  inference	  to	  the	  best	  explanation:	  the	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  is	  suitably	  correlated	  with	  responsibility	  and	  is	  therefore	  well	  placed	  to	  explain	  it.	  But	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  said	  in	  order	  to	  elucidate	  the	  connection.	  Why	  should	  responsibility	  require	  any	  capacity	  for	  reflection?	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  being	  responsible	  for	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  actions	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  being	  an	  appropriate	  target	  of	  reactive	  attitudes	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  make	  demands	  on	  one	  to	  comply	  with	  certain	  normative	  standards.	  But	  this	  in	  turn	  requires	  that	  one	  has	  some	  understanding	  of	  the	  normative	  standards	  that	  govern	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  actions	  together	  with	  some	  capacity	  to	  bring	  this	  understanding	  to	  bear	  in	  regulating	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  actions.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  requires	  the	  capacity	  for	  reflection.	  So	  the	  argument	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  	   (1) Being	  responsible	  is	  being	  an	  appropriate	  target	  of	  reactive	  attitudes.	  (2) Being	  an	  appropriate	  target	  of	  reactive	  attitudes	  requires	  having	  a	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  –	  that	  is,	  for	  understanding	  normative	  demands	  and	  bringing	  this	  understanding	  to	  bear	  in	  regulating	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  actions.	  (3) Therefore,	  being	  responsible	  requires	  a	  capacity	  for	  reflection.	  	  Here	  it	  helps	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  rationale	  for	  our	  social	  practice	  of	  subjecting	  one	  another	  to	  reactive	  attitudes	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  point	  of	  adopting	  reactive	  attitudes	  is	  to	  make	  demands	  on	  one	  another	  to	  comply	  with	  normative	  standards	  of	  morality	  and	  rationality.	  We	  don’t	  regard	  it	  as	  appropriate	  to	  adopt	  reactive	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attitudes	  towards	  other	  animals	  because	  there	  is	  no	  point	  in	  doing	  so:	  they	  cannot	  understand	  the	  demands	  we	  are	  thereby	  making	  on	  them.	  Animals	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  sensitive	  to	  the	  normative	  standards	  of	  justified	  belief	  and	  action,	  but	  they	  cannot	  understand	  those	  normative	  standards	  and	  bring	  this	  understanding	  to	  bear	  in	  regulating	  their	  beliefs	  and	  actions.	  That	  is	  why	  they	  cannot	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  justification	  of	  their	  beliefs	  and	  actions.	  I	  don’t	  claim	  any	  originality	  for	  this	  line	  of	  thought:	  for	  instance,	  it	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Burge’s	  work	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  concept	  in	  reflection.	  In	  the	  following	  passage,	  Burge	  draws	  the	  connection	  between	  personhood	  and	  responsibility,	  where	  responsibility	  requires	  a	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  –	  that	  is,	  for	  understanding	  normative	  demands	  and	  bringing	  this	  understanding	  to	  bear	  in	  regulating	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  actions	  using	  the	  first-­‐person	  concept:	  	   Insofar	  as	  full	  intellectual	  (or	  any	  other)	  responsibility	  requires	  the	  capacity	  to	   understand	   the	   way	   norms	   govern	   agency	   and	   the	   capacity	   to	  acknowledge	  the	  responsibility,	  a	  being	  that	  lacked	  the	  first-­‐person	  concept	  would	   not	   be	   fully	   responsible	   intellectually.	   It	   would	   not	   have	   a	   fully	  realized	   rational	   agency.	   Conceptualized	   self-­‐consciousness	   seems	   a	  necessary	   condition	   for	   fully	   responsible	   agency.	   Using	   the	   first-­‐person	  concept	  is	  necessary	  to	  being	  a	  fully	  realized	  person.	  (1998:	  262)	  	  My	  point	  here	  is	  that	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  can	  be	  used	  to	  answer	  the	  value	  problem.	  Reflection	  is	  valuable	  not	  because	  of	  its	  reliability,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  the	  sine	  qua	  none	  for	  being	  a	  person	  who	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  their	  beliefs	  and	  choices.	  Assuming	  that	  personhood	  is	  intrinsically	  valuable,	  so	  is	  reflection.	  To	  explain	  the	  value	  of	  reflection	  in	  terms	  of	  reliability	  alone	  is	  to	  overlook	  the	  evaluative	  significance	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  persons	  and	  other	  animals.	  Kornblith’s	  book	  does	  not	  discuss	  Burge’s	  work.	  To	  my	  mind,	  this	  is	  a	  shame	  because	  Burge	  proposes	  one	  of	  the	  more	  interesting	  accounts	  of	  the	  philosophical	  significance	  of	  reflection.	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  Kornblith	  discusses	  some	  related	  themes	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Frankfurt,	  Moran,	  and	  Sosa	  that	  tie	  the	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  together	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with	  notions	  of	  agency,	  freedom	  and	  responsibility.	  However,	  much	  of	  this	  discussion	  targets	  extraneous	  details	  that	  do	  not	  figure	  in	  the	  proposal	  articulated	  here.	  In	  particular,	  there	  is	  no	  commitment	  here	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  reflection	  involves	  epistemic	  agency,	  a	  claim	  that	  Kornblith	  attributes	  to	  both	  Sosa	  and	  Moran,	  and	  criticizes	  at	  some	  length.	  Reflection	  is	  a	  sine	  qua	  non	  for	  responsibility	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  involves	  a	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  agency.	  Since	  Kornblith	  does	  not	  explicitly	  address	  this	  proposal,	  I	  cannot	  predict	  his	  response,	  but	  I	  can	  see	  at	  least	  two	  options.	  The	  more	  radical	  option	  is	  to	  deny	  that	  there	  is	  any	  important	  evaluative	  distinction	  between	  persons	  and	  other	  animals	  in	  respect	  of	  responsibility.	  The	  more	  conservative	  option	  is	  to	  maintain	  that	  there	  is	  such	  an	  evaluative	  distinction	  between	  persons	  and	  other	  animals,	  while	  denying	  that	  the	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  is	  what	  grounds	  the	  distinction.	  There	  are	  hints	  in	  the	  book	  that	  suggest	  the	  more	  radical	  option.	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  Kornblith	  considers	  the	  proposal	  that	  human	  cognition	  is	  distinguished	  from	  animal	  cognition	  by	  the	  role	  that	  reflection	  plays	  in	  cognitive	  self-­‐management.	  On	  this	  view,	  reflection	  is	  presented	  as	  “the	  driving	  agent	  of	  cognitive	  improvement”	  (2012:	  104).	  The	  thrust	  of	  Kornblith’s	  discussion	  is	  that	  this	  exaggerates	  the	  contrast	  between	  human	  and	  animal	  cognition	  by	  overintellectualizing	  the	  former	  and	  underestimating	  the	  sophistication	  of	  the	  latter.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  animal	  cognition,	  Kornblith	  argues	  that	  reflection	  is	  not	  needed	  for	  cognitive	  self-­‐improvement,	  since	  many	  instances	  of	  animal	  learning	  involve	  not	  just	  updating	  beliefs	  in	  light	  of	  new	  information,	  but	  also	  more	  widespread	  changes	  in	  patterns	  of	  belief	  revision.	  Meanwhile,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  human	  cognition,	  Kornblith	  reiterates	  that	  reflection	  is	  not	  as	  effective	  in	  cognitive	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  we	  tend	  to	  assume,	  since	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  often	  epiphenomenal	  or	  worse.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  human	  cognition	  and	  animal	  cognition	  are	  much	  more	  continuous	  on	  Kornblith’s	  view	  than	  on	  many	  of	  the	  opposing	  views	  that	  he	  is	  criticizing.	  Now	  my	  claim	  is	  not	  that	  reflection	  is	  needed	  for	  cognitive	  self-­‐improvement,	  but	  rather	  that	  reflection	  is	  needed	  for	  responsibility	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  involves	  being	  an	  appropriate	  target	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  Much	  of	  the	  appeal	  of	  this	  claim	  lies	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  explain	  why	  we	  regard	  it	  as	  appropriate	  to	  adopt	  reactive	  attitudes	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towards	  persons	  but	  not	  other	  animals.	  In	  this	  respect	  at	  least,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  striking	  discontinuity	  between	  human	  cognition	  and	  animal	  cognition.	  One	  option	  for	  Kornblith	  here	  would	  be	  to	  argue	  that	  our	  practices	  rest	  on	  a	  mistake	  insofar	  as	  they	  presuppose	  that	  there	  is	  discontinuity	  between	  human	  and	  animal	  cognition.	  But	  this	  option	  raises	  difficult	  questions	  about	  how	  our	  practices	  should	  be	  revised.	  Should	  we	  relax	  them	  by	  holding	  adult	  humans	  to	  the	  same	  standards	  as	  non-­‐human	  animals	  or	  should	  we	  make	  them	  more	  stringent	  by	  holding	  non-­‐human	  animals	  to	  the	  same	  standards	  as	  human	  adults?	  Either	  way,	  this	  option	  is	  highly	  revisionary.	  The	  other	  option	  for	  Kornblith	  would	  be	  to	  argue	  that	  our	  practices	  can	  be	  explained	  and	  justified	  without	  appeal	  to	  reflection.	  But	  of	  course	  this	  option	  faces	  the	  challenge	  to	  supply	  such	  a	  justifying	  explanation.11	  There	  may	  be	  other	  options	  too.	  I	  don’t	  know	  which	  Kornblith	  will	  take,	  but	  I	  expect	  there	  is	  much	  to	  be	  learned	  from	  further	  discussion	  of	  these	  options.	  	  
6. Conclusions	  I	  want	  to	  conclude	  by	  returning	  to	  Kornblith’s	  challenge	  for	  Sosa’s	  distinction	  between	  animal	  knowledge	  and	  reflective	  knowledge.	  Why	  should	  we	  think	  this	  distinction	  is	  worth	  drawing	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  carves	  at	  the	  epistemological	  joints?	  Here	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  my	  response.	  Animal	  knowledge	  is	  justified	  belief,	  but	  animals	  cannot	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  justification	  of	  their	  beliefs	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  involves	  making	  demands	  on	  them	  by	  adopting	  reactive	  attitudes.	  After	  all,	  they	  lack	  any	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  and	  hence	  for	  understanding	  these	  normative	  demands.	  Reflective	  knowledge,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  not	  only	  justified	  but	  also	  responsibly	  held	  on	  basis	  of	  reflection	  upon	  normative	  demands.	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  animal	  knowledge	  and	  reflective	  knowledge	  traces	  back	  to	  our	  practice	  of	  holding	  one	  another	  responsible	  by	  making	  demands	  on	  each	  other	  through	  the	  
                                                11	  Doris	  (2009)	  takes	  this	  option:	  he	  argues	  that	  avoiding	  skepticism	  about	  persons	  requires	  rejecting	  a	  view	  that	  he	  calls	  “reflectivism”	  about	  persons,	  although	  he	  does	  not	  address	  the	  challenge	  of	  proposing	  an	  alternative	  conception	  to	  replace	  it.	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adoption	  of	  reactive	  attitudes.	  A	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  that	  neglects	  this	  distinction	  therefore	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  one	  of	  our	  most	  basic	  normative	  commitments.12	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